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Certain events leave an indelible mark on 
our lives. For people working in the area of 
finance, Lehman Brothers going into 
Chapter 11 on 15 September, 2008 clearly 
falls into this category. The global financial 
crisis was a watershed moment, dramatically 
changing the operating environment for 
financial markets, with the authorities 
tightening the regulatory framework 
appreciably since then. This has affected 
financial markets profoundly, and perhaps 
in ways unintended by policy makers. The 
new regulations, for example, aim to reduce 
market volatility and risks to intermediaries. 
However I would argue that not only are 
these safeguards yet to be tested, it remains 
unclear whether or not the current regime 
could dampen the negative impact of the 
next financial crisis—when it happens.
This article focuses on some of the key 
changes introduced since the Lehman crisis 
and the impact they are having on economies 
and financial markets, particularly in Asia. 
It also discusses the potential pitfalls and 
unintended consequences of some of these 
changes, as well as offers broad solutions 
to combat the challenges arising from the 
evolving financial landscape.
Bonds will grow at the 
expense of loans
The Basel III regulations were introduced 
with a view to shoring up banks’ capital 
to ensure an adequate cushion against 
economic shocks and a potential 
deterioration in bank portfolios. This was 
meant to reduce contingent liabilities on 
governments and taxpayers, and to reduce 
pressure points in the economies where 
banks operate. These regulations may be 
more relevant to (and perhaps designed for) 
developed markets (DM), where banks on 
average had lower capital levels relative to 
those in emerging markets (EM) prior to 
the Lehman crisis. However, their impact 
is being felt in both markets. The introduction 
of Basel III in various jurisdictions—and its 
anticipated introduction in others—has 
prompted banks to preserve scarce capital 
by reducing leverage and shedding risk 
assets. As a result, lending has come under 
pressure. This is particularly true for 
European banks, whose capital levels 
were low to start with. 
While EM banks (and Asian banks in 
particular) are well capitalised, they are 
also likely to see an impact on their loan 
markets over time. Asian banks in most 
jurisdictions are currently more than 
adequately capitalised with respect to 
Basel III. However, as they are called upon 
to support the region’s economic growth 
over the next decade, they are likely to 
run up against capital constraints. This 
will force them to make a tough choice 
between preserving capital (and thereby 
reducing lending) or continuing to lend 
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but risking running short of capital. I believe 
banks are likely to choose  the former option, 
causing them to scale back (or at least 
not increase) their loan exposure. A clear 
unintended consequence of this reform is 
the crowding out of corporates, particularly 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
from the loan markets. I expect many of 
these companies to turn instead to the 
corporate bond markets, a shift that is 
already evident in record issuance levels 
in both local-currency and hard-currency 
corporate credit markets (refer to Figure 
1). This is likely to increase the size of 
the region’s corporate bond markets over 
the medium-term as corporates seek 
longer-term (and arguably, less covenant-
heavy) funding. Basel III implementation 
is likely to accelerate this transition 
towards corporate bond-market financing 
and push more corporates, especially 
higher-rated ones, to access bond markets 
directly rather than borrow from banks. 
Within Asia, I expect the biggest growth 
in China and India; the former is likely to 
represent more than 50 percent of the 
Asian corporate credit market over the 
next few years (refer to Figure 2).
Disappearing 
market liquidity 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act—better known as 
Dodd-Frank—was a response to the global 
financial crisis of 2008. Its intention was to 
prevent another collapse of a major financial 
institution like Lehman Brothers. Dodd-
Frank includes major areas of reform and 
hundreds of pages of regulations and rules. 
The law subjects banks to a number of 
regulations, with the possibility of breaking 
up banks if they are deemed to be ‘too big to 
fail’. The Volcker Rule, part of Dodd-Frank, 
prohibits banks from owning, investing in 
or sponsoring hedge funds or any proprietary 
trading operations for their own profit. The 
rule on proprietary trading has had a 
profound impact on secondary-market 
liquidity. With regulations severely 
restricting how long trading desks can hold 
securities, bank trading desks have become 
much less willing to hold securities, even for 
market-making purposes. With little or no 
inventory, it is unsurprising that secondary-
market liquidity is a shadow of its former self. 
New York Fed data suggests that U.S. 
primary dealers’ net position in corporate 
debt has declined by more than half since 
the Lehman crisis (refer to Figure 3).
too much money 
chasing too few assets
The global financial crisis changed the 
way investors view emerging markets. 
Investors globally recognised that they 
had arguably mispriced risk, assigning 
too little risk to DM and too much to 
EM. This mispricing of risk resulted in 
an under-allocation of portfolios to EM. 
After the Lehman crisis, global investors 
tried to correct this misallocation, and 
increasingly directed funds towards EM.
The surfeit of easy money owing to 
quantitative easing and accommodative 
monetary policies around the world 
accentuated the reallocation of funds in 
favour of EM (refer to Figure 4). The 
resulting search for yield unleashed a rush 
for EM assets, and EM bonds, in particular, 
benefited from these fund flows. In the five 
years since the Lehman crisis, inflows to EM 
debt have far exceeded the levels witnessed 
prior to the global financial crisis (refer to 
Figure 5). There have been periods when 
the size of the inflows has exceeded the size 
of the tradable markets.
market implications: 
sidestepping 
secondary markets
The confluence of regulatory changes and 
easy money has created three most 
interesting (and potentially challenging) 
dynamics in EM financial markets. 
Firstly, Basel III will likely cause 
banks to withdraw (at the margin) from 
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loan markets, consequently increasing 
corporates’ reliance on bond markets. 
This will result in much faster growth in 
corporate bond markets. While reliance 
on bond markets is already prevalent in 
the developed world, I expect it to 
accelerate growth in EM bond markets, 
particularly Asia. 
However not all Asian banks are 
equally well positioned to embark on this 
Basel III journey. While banking sectors 
in Southeast Asia are extremely well 
capitalised, India’s public-sector banks 
and China’s banks will need additional 
capital in order to support the financing 
needs of domestic corporates; and with 
capital becoming an increasingly scarce 
commodity, I expect banks to be more 
selective in lending to corporates. Banks 
are likely to favour larger corporates; 
this could potentially crowd out small- 
and medium-sized enterprises, resulting 
in potentially higher levels of stress and 
defaults in this segment.
Meanwhile raising capital (via 
government injections or the equity 
markets) would allow banks to preserve 
their lending to corporates. However, if 
they are unable to increase their capital in 
line with financing requirements, economic 
growth in their jurisdictions will likely 
be lower. 
Growth in corporate bond markets is 
a clear consequence of tighter lending 
conditions. Corporate bond markets in 
Asia excluding Japan could grow to around 
US$10 trillion and represent around 40 
percent of the overall financing mix toward 
the end of this decade (refer to Figure 6). 
Secondly, Dodd-Frank and the 
Volcker Rule have presaged declining 
secondary-market liquidity. With banks 
unable to take proprietary positions, their 
need and willingness to hold bond inventory 
is negligible. This means that the trading 
desks making markets on these are also 
shrinking in size. This is forcing investors 
to rely largely on primary bond markets 
(new issues) to meet their requirements. 
Sell-side banks are much smaller now 
than they were before the global financial 
crisis. Trading operations have been 
trimmed, particularly on the fixed income 
side, with significant headcount reductions. 
While this has played out more clearly in the 
West, it has been a global phenomenon. 
As these operations generate lower 
income, bank income pools have been 
reduced. This has increased cost pressure 
on banks, resulting in lower compensation 
and reduced hiring by the sector, making the 
sector a less attractive destination for fresh 
graduates entering the job market. 
Declining secondary-market liquidity is 
also forcing investors to rely largely on the 
primary markets to meet their portfolio needs. 
Thirdly, the readjustment of EM risk 
premiums and the surfeit of easy money 
after the Lehman crisis have resulted in 
a surge of fund flows to EM, particularly 
EM debt. As a result, EM debt portfolios 
have grown manifold in the five-year period 
since the crisis (refer to Figure 5). With 
global asset managers continuing to 
increase their Assets Under Management 
(AUM) allocation to EM debt, the buy-side 
is likely to continue to grow.
Buy-side AUM, particularly for EM and 
Asian portfolio managers, continues to 
grow, and is significantly larger than that of 
sell-side institution trading desks. This 
means that secondary-market liquidity 
cannot fully support the trading flows of the 
buy-side. As highlighted above, buy-side 
firms have to rely on primary issuance to 
meet most of their portfolio needs. Given 
their size and relatively poor secondary-
market liquidity, it is very difficult for the 
buy-side to accumulate meaningful 
positions (in terms of portfolio returns) via 
the secondary markets. 
Decreased liquidity from sell-side 
banks in the secondary markets is giving 
rise to a new breed of ‘buy-side to buy-side’ 
brokers. These new intermediaries are 
linking buy-side institutions to each other 
and bypassing sell-side banks altogether. 
While this is helping buy-side institutions 
to bypass secondary-market liquidity 
constraints, the rise of a new breed of 
unregulated institutions servicing the buy 
side could also pose new challenges. 
Buy-side firms are starting to use credit 
default swaps (CDS) to express more tactical 
views. CDS liquidity tends to be better, 
allowing these investors to get in and out of 
trades much more easily. CDS are generally 
less balance sheet-intensive than cash bonds, 
and therefore more palliative for sell-side 
banks. While buy-side brokers and CDS 
trading are being used fairly extensively in 
other jurisdictions, their use in Asia has been 
limited to date.
thin liquidity has 
made markets 
one-dimensional
Growth in EM portfolios dovetails well with 
the surge in issuance over the past few years. 
However, with sharply reduced secondary-
market liquidity and bank trading unable to 
support these investors’ increased positions, 
there is potentially no exit for these EM bond 
portfolios. While EM is a legitimate asset 
class that is here to stay, it is unhealthy for 
markets to have no exit. In my conversations 
with global investors, I repeatedly hear that 
market liquidity is significantly worse today, 
even more than the post-Lehman crisis ‘dark 
days’ of late 2008 and early 2009. If investors 
want to reduce their positions, there is 
limited scope for them to do so via the 
secondary markets. This is unhealthy, and 
could result in a serious market crisis should 
investors need to get out of their positions. 
It increases the risk of a disorderly sell-off. 
how do we mind the 
liquidity gap?
Market participants have recognised 
these issues for some time. The key 
question is whether regulators are also 
thinking of these issues. They appear to 
be. The European Central Bank and the 
FIGuRE 6: ASIAN CORPORAtE FuNDING MARKEt
Source: Standard Chartered Research
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015F 2017F
Corporate bond market is expected to fill the gap, US$ tn
 Domestic corporate loans
 Foreign corporate loans
 Non-sovereign bonds
FIGuRE 5: ASSEt AllOCAtION tO EM DEbt hAS 
RISEN NEARly thREE-FOlD SINCE 2008 
Source: EPFR Global, Standard Chartered Research
200 350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Cumulative EM bond fund flows since 2003
% of AUM
(RHS)
FLOWS
(US$ bn)
Sell-side institutions 
need to manage 
scarce market liquidity 
very carefully so as to 
limit potential damage 
to the P&L and capital. 
This means secondary 
liquidity is unlikely to 
improve soon. Given 
these regulations and 
the asymmetric risk-
reward for sell-side 
institutions, these 
institutions have no 
incentive to step in and 
provide ample liquidity 
during periods of 
market stress. 
16 Asian Management Insights
Bank of England have both cited lack of 
secondary-market liquidity in bond 
markets as a source of potential concern 
in their latest financial stability reports. 
The hope is that the authorities will look 
into the unintended consequences of 
these changes and take steps to address 
some of the challenges emanating from 
poor secondary-market liquidity across 
different markets. 
Meanwhile, market makers must deal with 
the impact of these measures in their own 
ways. Sell-side institutions must manage 
scarce market liquidity very carefully so as to 
limit potential damage to the P&L and capital. 
This means secondary liquidity is unlikely to 
improve soon. Given these regulations and 
the asymmetric risk-reward for sell-side 
institutions, these institutions have no 
incentive to step in and provide ample liquidity 
during periods of market stress. 
Buy-side institutions are managing 
this new environment with measures of 
their own. Portfolio managers are 
maintaining higher cash balances and are 
largely staying close to their respective 
benchmarks. Moreover, given poor 
secondary-market liquidity, their ability 
to build meaningful positions via the 
secondary markets is limited. Instead, they 
are using the rapidly growing primary 
markets to deploy their cash. Given the 
size of buy-side firms (AUMs have grown 
rapidly at a time when the net position of 
the sell-side has decreased markedly) and 
poor secondary-market liquidity, they have 
a limited ability to make significant 
portfolio changes via the secondary 
markets. That said, buy-side firms are 
starting to turn firstly to non-traditional 
providers of liquidity (as highlighted 
above), and secondly, do more CDS trades 
(relative to cash trades) to express tactical 
views, in an attempt to bypass the 
secondary-market liquidity constraints of 
the sell-side.
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